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1. Introduction
This paper is addressed to some of the more important
applications of bilinear programming which is a technique for
solving a special class of nonconvex quadratic programming
problems with the following structure:
O,A2x2=b2 ,x2 ｾ O}
(1.1)
n. m. m. xn.
where c
1
. £ R 1, b. £ R 1, A. £ R 1 1, i = 1,2,
1 1
n.
constants and xi £ R 1, i = 1,2 are variables. We will refer
to this as a bilinear program in standard minimization form.
Corresponding to the above,
(1 .2)
will be referred to as a bilinear program in canonical mini-
mization form. Bilinear programs in standard and canonical
maximization form will be defined anologously. As in the case
of linear programming, bilinear program with general mixed
equality and inequality constraints can be reduced to a stan-
dard form and to a canonical form as long as the linear con-
straints with respect to x 1 and x 2 are separable with each
other.
Several papers have appeared since 1971 dealing with the
algorithms to solve this class of problem or its equivalent,
among which Konno [13], [15], Gallo-Ulkucu [7 ], Falk [5 ] are
notable. Recently, the author implemented his algorithm on
CYBER 74 to get encouraging numerical results [13]. At the
same time, he established the finite convergence of his cutting
plane algorithm [15] with the incorporation of facial cut intro-
duced by Majthay and Whinston [19]. Now that there is a workable
algorithm, we will pursue further to show the appliciability of
bilinear programming to real world problems. In fact, the ex-
istence of many practical problems which are naturally put into
the structure of bilinear program motivated the author's work
(1 .3)
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in algorithm.
Before going into typical applications, we will briefly
summarize the relationship of bilinear program (BLP) to other
groups of mathematical programming problems.
First of all, BLP is a very straightforward extension of
linear programs (LP) (see e. g. [ 3 ] ) •
min {ctxlAx = b, x ｾ O}
x
where c, x ERn, b' E Rm, A E RffiXn and c is a fixed cost vector.
If we want to vary c as well as x in a polyhedral convex set,
say,
then the problem becomes a BLP where c 1 = c 2 = 0 and Q is an
n x n"identity matrix in (1.1). We will refer to this problem
min {ctxlAX = b, x ｾ 0, AIC = b l , C ｾ O} (1. 4)
as an extended linear program (ELP) in standard minimization
form. tve will discuss several examples of ELP in Chapters 2 and 3.
Secondly, there is a similar but entirely different class
of problems called a generalized linear program (GLP) introduced
by Dantzig and Wolfe [3]:
n
G .x.1 Y ( c j ) EC. C Rm+1min { jI1 a.x. = b, x. > 0, ,(c.,a.,x.) J J j=1 J J J - a. JJJ J J
1, .•• ,n}j = (1 .5)
where a. E Rm and C. is a closed convex set, j = 1, ••• ,n.
J J
This program is the source of the famous decomposition algorithm.
Here the column vectors (C j ) as well as x. 's are variables and
each column (C j ) is ｡ ｬ ｬ ｯ Ｂ Ｌ Ｚ ｾ -:::0 move in a ｾｬｯｳ･､ convex set C .
a. J
independendly' 6f each other. This independence property dis-
tinguishes itself from BLP and it is quite essential for GLP
algorithm (decomposition algorithm) to work (see [3]) Ｎ ｬ ｾ will look
into the relationship between GLP and BLP in section 5.1 and
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show that the special case of a non-standard generalized linear
program, i.e., a GLP some of whose variables x. are not
J
restricted in sign, is essentially a BLP.
Thirdly, it will be shown in section 4.1, that the so-
called linear max-min problem (U1MP):
(1 .6)
where X and Yare polyhedral convex sets, can be converted into
a BLP by taking the partial dual of (1.6) with respect to Y
under some regularity condition. This problem was treated by
Falk [5] as well as by Dantzig [4] and Konno [17]. It will
be shown in section 3.1 that ｌ ｾ Ｑ ｐ has several applications
with game theoretic flavour.
Fourthly, it is possible, at least theoretically to trans-
form the problem with complementarity condition
(1 .7)
tinto a BLP by putting x 1x 2 term into the objective function as
follows:
where M is a large positive constant. (1.7) was analyzed by
Ibaraki [10] and by Konno [17]. We will briefly touch on this
topic in section 5.2.
Finally, it has been proved in [14] that the minimization
of concave quadratic function subject to linear constraints
(CQP) :
(1 .8)
where Q is a symmetric negative semi-definite matrix, can be
converted into a BLP:
min {ctu + ctv + utOvlAU = b,u > O,Av = b,v > O}
(1 .9)
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The relationship between (1.8) and (1.9) has been fully discussed
elsewhere [14], where we will show that (i) if x* is optimal for
(1.8), then (u,v) = (x*,x*) is optimal for (1.9) and (ii) if
(u*,v*) is optimal for (1.9), then both u* and v* are optimal
for (1.8). Also it has been shown how to exploit the symmetric
structure of (1.9) to improve the cutting plane algorithm
developed in [13]. It is well known that CQP is closely related
to 0-1 integer program and there-ore BLP is indirectly related
to 0-1 integer program.
The following figure briefly summarizes the relationship
among various problems cited above, the details of which will
be discussed in full scope.
SPECIAL STRUCTURE
FIGURE 1.1
at the appropriate places.
In the following chapters, we will choose some of the
typical examples from the various areas of applications and
discuss them in some detail. We tried to pick up, among others,
the problems which are of practical, theoretical and computa-
tional interests. This paper is an elaboration of the author's
earlier paper [17] with significant revisions and additions.
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2. Extended Linear Programs
In this chapter we will discuss two typical examples of
BLP with very natural physical and economical interpretation.
The first one is minimization of the transportation cost which
is the cross product of quantity and distance. The second one
is the application in decision analysis in which we want to
minimize the cross product of prol ability measure and weights
of importance.
2.1 Location-Allocation Problems
There is a large amount of literature under the title of
location-allocation theory. (See, for example, reference [24]).
Suppose we are given
a} a set of m points distributed in the plane
b} a vector value to be attached to each point
c} a set of indivisible centroids without predetermined
locations
then the location-allocation problem in its most general form
is to find locations for m centroids and an allocation of vector
value associated with n points to some centroid so as to mini-
mize the total cost. Here, we will present one original example
of this type of problems which is put into the structure of BLP
in a very natural way.
(a) Single Factory Case
= 1, ... ,n.
Let there be m cities Pi' i = 1, ... ,m on a plane.
located at (p.,q.) relative to some coordinate system.
1 1
going to construct a factory somewhere on this plane.
factory needs b j units of n different materials Mj , j
P. is
1
\'le are
This
-6-
Figure 2. 1 . 1 Single Factory Case
b. = requirement for M.
J J
u .. = shipment of M. from p.1.J J 1.
a .. = supply of Mj at p.1.J 1.
C .• = unit price of M. at P.1.J J 1.
f. = unit shipment cost of M.J J
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Let us assume that P. can supply a .. units of M
J
. at the unit
1 lJ
price c .. and the unit transportation cost (per unit amount perlJ
unit distance) of M. is given by f .. Our concern now is to
J J
minimize the total expense which is represented by the sum of
total purchasing cost and the total transportation cost.
Let Q(xo'yo) be the location of the factory to be constructed
and let u .. be the amount of M. to be purchased at Pl" Then u·.lJ J lJ
has to satisfy:
m
I u· . > b. j = 1 , .•. ,nlJ - Ji=1
°
< u· . < a .. i = 1 , ... ,m j = 1 , ••• , n
- lJ - lJ
(2.1.1)
Total purchasing cost Cp is obviously given by:
C =p
m n
I I
i=1 j=1
c .. u ..lJ lJ (2.1.2)
and total transportation cost CT is given by
m n
C = I I f. • u·· d(Pi,Q)
T i=1 j=1 J lJ (2.1.3)
where d(Pi,Q) is the distance between Pi and Q.
i) Manhattan Distance
If the distance d(Pi,Q) is given by 1 norm i.e.,
d(P1"Q) = d 1 (P1·,Q) Ip· - x I + Iq· - y I- 1 0 1 0 (2.1.4)
then the total cost C is given by
m nI I [c ..u,. + f. u .. ( Ip. -x I
i=1 j=1 lJ lJ J lJ 1 0C = + Iqi-yo l )]
(2.1.5)
By introducing auxiliary variables, xiI and Yil satisfying
Xi1-- x i2 = p. - Xo x i1 > 0, x i2 > 0, x i1 x i2 = 0, i = 1 , •• • ,m1 - -
Yi1 - Yi2 = q. - Yo Yi 1 > 0, Yi2 > 0, Yi1 Yi2 = 0, i = , , ••• , m1 - -
(2.1.6)
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the absolute value terms can be written as:
(2.1.7)
So the problem now is to
minimize C =
s.t.
m
L u .. > b. j = 1 , •.. , n1J - Ji=1
0 < u· . < a .. i = 1, .. . ,m, j = 1 , ••• , n
- 1J - 1J
Xi 1 - xi2 + Xo = p.1
1 = 1 , ••• , m
y i 1 - Yi2 + Yo = q.1
XiI > 0 Yil > 0 i = 1, ... ,m, I = 1 ,2,
- -
= 0 i = 1, .•.m
(2.1.8)
It is straightforward to show that the optimal solution of the
associated bilinear program without the orthogonality condition
in (2.18) automatically satisfy the orthognality property if
f j ｾ 0, j =.1, .•. ,n and hence the 'problem can be solved by
applying the algorithm developed in [13].
ii) Euclidean Distance
If on the other hand, the distance d(Pi,Q) is given by
2 norm, i.e.,
d(Pi,Q) = d 2 (Pi'Q) - ｉＨｐｩﾷＺ［ＭｾＩＲｾｾ (qi ｾ Yo)2'
Ｈ ｾ Ｎ Ｑ Ｎ ｾ Ｉ
then the problem becomes:
o < u.. < a.. i = 1, •.. ,m
1) - 1)
-9-
m n
[c ij
'-----i··
y ) 2J u ..minimize C = L L + f. I(p. - x) + (q.
i=1 j=1 ) 1 0 1 o 1)
m
L- u .. > b. j = 1 , ••• , n
i=1 1) - )
j = 1, ••• ,n
(2.1.10)
to which we can apply a modified version of the BLP algorithm.
(b) Multi-Factory Case
Let us consider here the multi factory version of the
problem treated in the previous section. The basic setting of
Jthe problem is the same as before except
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Let
k
u ..
1)
ｋ Ｈ ｾ 1) factories Fk , k = 1, ... ,K have to be constructed
each factory is produving L different types of
commodities C.Q,' .Q, = 1, ... ,L
each product has to be shipped to the demand points
i.e., to m cities.
the amount of Mj to be purchased at Pi and shipped
to Fk
amount of C.Q, to be shipped to Pi from Fk
amount of Mj required at Fk
a ..
1)
c ..
1)
dk
.Q,
maximum supply of Mj at
unit price of M. at p.) 1
amount of C.Q, produced at
p.
1
ei.Q,
(p. , q . )
1 1
(Xk'Yk)
d(Pi,Fk )
f.)
g.Q,
demand for C.Q, at P.
1
-location of P.
1
location of Fk
distance between P .. and F]
1 ｾ
unit transportation cost of M.)
unit transportation cost of C.Q,
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The total cost is now given by
m n K k m K L k n k
c= I I I c ..u .. + I I ( I glxU + I f .u. .) d (P. ,Fk)i=1 j=1 k=1 1) 1) i=1 k=1 ｾ］Ｑ j=1 ) 1) 1 (2.1.11)
Also k and k satisfy:u· . ｸｩｾ have to1)
m k ｢ｾI u .. > j = 1, ... ,'1 k = 1 , .•. ,K
i=1 1) - )
K kI u .. < a· . i = 1 , ... , m j = 1 , ••• , n
k=1 1) - 1)
m k d kI Xu < ｾ = 1 , ..• , L k = 1 , .•. , K
i=1 - ｾ
K kI Xu > ･Ｎｾ 1 = 1 , ••• , m k = 1 , ... , K
- 1.k=1
k
> 0 k > 0 (2.1.12)u· . ｘｩｾ1) - -
Hence now the problem is to minimize (2.1.11) subject to (2.1.12)
which is a BLP if d(',') is defined by 1 Ulorm.
We assumed here that there are no material flows between
the factories to be constructed. Should there be such a flow,
then the problem can no longer be formulated in the framework
of bilinear programming.
2.2 Applications to Decision Analysis
Suppose a decision maker is facing a problem of choosing
the 'best' among m possible alternatives A., i = 1, .•• ,m in the
1
stochastic environment where n possible events Ej , j = 1, ••• ,n
takes place with probability p .. when A. is chosen.
1) 1
Let us suppose also that there are K independent attributes
(objectives) Tk , k = 1, .•. , K, each of which has weight (degree
of importance) wk' Also let us assume that the utility asso-
ciated with the triple (A.,E.,T l ), is given by ｡ ｾ Ｎ and that the1 ) '" 1)
overall utility of the decision maker is additive, i.e., the
-11-
expected utility u. obtained by choosing A. is given by
1 1
u· =1 (2.2.1)
kGiven the constants wk ' p .. , a .. , we can choose the optimal1) 1)
alternative by simply comparing u., i = 1, •.• ,m.
. 1
It sometimes happens, however, due to the lack of informa-
tion that the quantities wk ' k = 1, .•• ,K and Pij' i = 1, ••• ,m;
j = 1, .•• ,n are not known precisely. Typically, the analyst
has to interview the decision maker to estimate the weight of
relative importance wk of Tk and it sometimes happens that we
only have interval estimates
k = 1, ••• ,K
where ｾ ｫ and wk are given constants (see [23]).
Similar situation applies as well to the probability measure
kp ..• Let us suppose here that
1)
-
Eij ｾ Pij ｾ Pij i = 1, ••• ,m ; j = 1, ••• ,n
n
Lj=1 p .. = 11) i = 1, ••• ,m
where E .. and p .. are given constants.
1) 1)
In this case, the optimal alternative will not be uniquely
determined. However, some of the alternatives may be eliminated
as inefficient ones as follows:
Let
W= {(w1 ' ••• , wk ) I ｾｫ < wk < wk }
P. = { (p . 1 ' ••• , p. ) Ip .. < p .. < p ..1 1 1n -1) - 1) - 1)
n
l p .. = 1} . i = 1 , ••• , mj=1 1)
which we assume to be nonempty.
(2.2.2)
j=1, ••• ,n;
(2.2.3)
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Let
K n
WkP' Ｎ ｡ ｾ ﾷ ｉ ｗ ｃ Ｚ ｖ ｬ Ｌu. = min { L L p. c:P.}
-1 k=1 j=1 1J 1J 1 1
K n k
- { L L p. c:P.}u· = max wkP' . a .. Iwc:W ,1 k=1 j=1 1J 1J 1 1
(2.2.4)
(2.2.5)
It is obvious that if ｾ ｲ > us' then Ar is preferred to As and
As can be eliminated from the candifates of optimal alternatives.
Similarly, if
- min
then A
r
is preferred to As and As can be eliminated.
Problems (2.2.4) (2.2.5) and (2.2.6) are all bilinear programs
with a very special structure. Let us take for example (2.2.4)
suppressing index i:
k n k
min L La. p .Wkk=1 j=1 J J
n
s.t. L p. = 1 E· < p. < p.J J - J - Jj=1
ｾ ｫ < wk < wk , k = 1 , .•. , K- -
j = 1, .•• ,n
(2.2.7)
The following theorem characterizes the form of an optimal
solution of (2.2.7) which is guaranteed to exist since Wand
P are non-empty compact convex sets.
Theorem 2.2.1
Let wk ' k = Ｑｾ •.• ,K; p., j = 1, ••. ,n be an optimal solutionJ _
of (2.2.7). Then wk is equal to ｾ ｫ or wk for all k. Also, Pj
is equal to Ej or Pj except possibly for one index joe
Proof
Wand P are bounded polyhedral convex sets. Hence by the
fundamental theorem BLP [13], there exists an optimal solution
" "(w,p) where wand p are extreme points of Wand P, respectively.
-13-
It is easy to see that any extreme point of Wand P has the
property stated in the theorem. I I
Using this theorem, we can construct a simple enumeration
technique by fixing wk equal to ｾ ｫ or wk. Also it may be more
appropriate in some cases to normalize wk ' k = 1, ••• , K toK
satisfy the condition 2 Wk = 1, as well as p. in which casek=1 J
we still have a bilinear ｰ ｲ ｯ ｧ ｲ ｡ ｭ ｾ ｩ ｴ ｨ somewhat more complicated
structure. We will not, however, go into details about these
any further. For the background material of decision analysis
the readers are referred to Keeney-Raiffa [12] and to Sarin [23].
-14-
3. Bilinear Assignment Problems
3.1 Introduction
Let there be n machines and n jobs and assume that one and
only one machine has to be assigned to each of the n jobs. Let
Pij be the profit associated with assigning machine i to j.
Then the problem of maximizing total profit can be formulated
as follows:
n n
maximize L L p .. x·.
i=1 j=1 1) 1)
n
s.t. L x .. = 1j=1 1)
n
L x .. = 1
i=1 1)
x· . = 0 or 11)
i = 1, ... ,n
j = 1, .•. ,ni
i,j = 1, ... ,n.
(3.1.1)
This problem is called a standard linear assignment problem.
Let
2 n
Zn = {(zij) E:Rn I L
j=1
z .. = 1, i = 1, ... ni
1)
n
L
i=1
z .. = 1,
1)
and
j = 1, ... ,ni z .. > 0, i,j = 1, .•. ,n}
1) (3.1.2)
I 2
Z = {( z .. ) Rn I (z .. ) E: Z , z.. = 0 or 1, i, j = 1, ..• , n}
n 1) 1) n 1)
(3.1.3)
It it well known that all the extreme points of Zn belong to
zI and hence 0-1 constraints on the variables ln (3.1.1) can be
n
replaced by nonnegativity constraints, so that (3.1.1) is
equivalent to the following linear program (see e.g. [3 ]).
n n
maximize {L L
i=1 j=1
p .. x .. l(x .. )E:Z}1) 1) 1) n (3 • 1 • 4 )
As a natural extension to the above, the following quadratic
-15-
assignment problem:
n n n n
maximize {L L L L
i=1 j=1 r=1 s=1
rs I Ia .. x .. x (x .. )E:Z}1) 1) rs 1) n (3.1.5)
has been considered by several authors. Unfortunately, however,
ｚ ｾ cannot be replaced by Zn in this case and the problem is
difficult to solve in general (see [8], [22]).
Let us introduce here a new class of assignment problems:
maximize
n n n n rs I I{L L L L a .. x .. y I (x .. )E:Z , (Yrs)E:Zn }
s=1 1) 1) rs 1) ni=1 j=1 r=1 (3.1.6)
We will call (3.1.6) a standard bilinear assignment problem. As
in the linear case, this problem has a very nice structure as
shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1.1
(3.1.6)
maximize
Proof
is equivalent to
n n n n{L L L L ｡ｾｾｸ .. y sl (x .. )£Z , (Yrs)£Zn}
i=1 j=1 r=1 s=1 1) 1) r 1) n
(3.1.7)
(3.1.7) is a bilinear program in standard form and Z is
n
non-empty and bounded. Hence by the fundamental theorem of
"ｂｾｐ (see [13]) this problem has an optimal solution (xij ) and
(y ), both of which are extreme points of Z. Also, any
rs I "
extreme point of Z belongs to Z and hence the pair (x .. ),
" n n 1)
(Yrs) is an optimal solution of (3.1.6). I I
The implication of this theorem is that we can obtain a
locally optimal solution by the repeated use of simplex algorithm,
Le., by the augmented mountain climbing algorithm described in [13],
which is not the case for general quadratic assignment problems.
We can obtain, if we like, a global optimal solution by applying
the full version of the cutting plane algorithm proposed in [15].
We will discuss three typical examples of bilinear assignment
problems in the following sections.
-16-
3.2 Multi-Stage Markovian Assignment Problem and Three
Dimensional Assignment Problem
3.2.1 Multi-Stage Markovian Assignment Problem
the first stage and one and only
k = 1, ... ,n at the second stage.
stage is given by Pij' Due to
to different kind of jobs, the outcome
at the second stage depends upon which
Let us consider the two stage version of the standard
linear assignment problem. Let there be n machines M.,
1
i = 1, ... ,n as before and each one of these machines has to be
aSoigned to one and only one of the n jobs ｊ Ｇ ｾ Ｌ j = 1, .•. , n at
J 2
one of the n jobs J k ,1}n 2 nHere {J j 1 and {Jk }1 need
will assume that the outcomenot be the same set of jobs. We
associated with M. ｾ ｊｾ at first
1 J
necessary machine setup
. d . h 2assoc1ate W1t Mi ｾ J k
.......- ...
i 'i 1.1 1 :. !
.._....--'
. 1\
. J 1; J
1 \2 '
J1' ,
-........
, i J2 Ｇ Ｎ ｾH \ I,
n / n n
I1achine 1st stage jobs 2nd stage jobs
(3.2.1)otherwise
ｸ ｾ Ｎ = 111J
o
job M1· was assigned to in the first stage. Let p. 'k be the2 . 1 1J
outcome associated with Mi ｾ J k glven M. ｾ J ..1 £ J
For £ = 1,2, let us define variables x .. as follows:
1J
if Mi is assigned to ｊ ｾ at stage £
Then the two stage optimization problem is formulated as
max
-17-
n n n 1 2L L L (p,. + p, 'k)x, ,x'k
i=1 j=1 k=1 1J 1J 1J 1
(3.2.2)
s. t. 1 I(x, ,) E: Z1J n
2 zI(x, .) c::1J n
where zI is defined by (3.1.3), 7hich is equivalent to
n
n n n 1 2
max L L L (p. , + p, 'k)x, ,x 'k
i=1 j=1 k=1 1J 1J IJ 1
(3.2.3)
s.t. 1(x, ,) E: Z1J n
R,
the assignment Mi + J k at stage
Then the problem becomes
as we have shown in Theorem 3.1.1.
This approach applies to the general L stage assignment
problem as long as the inter-stage dependence is Markovian,
i.e., if the outcome of a particular assignment at stage t is
dependent only upon the current assignment and the assignment
of the previous stage.
R,Let q. 'k be the outcome of
1J R,-1
R, given M, + J. at stage R,-1.
1 J
R, = 1, •.• ,L
ｑ ｾ =
1
I
maximize
R, I
s.t. (x' ,) E: Z1J n
R,
= (x..), Q, = 1,...,Land 1e t1J
R,
qi1n i = 1, ... ,n;
/ R, = 1, .•• ,L;
QR, =
x, = 1, .•• ,L ｾ
(3.2.5)
(3.2.4)
(3.2.6)
-18-
For simplicity, let L be an even integer and let
1 2
x x
3 4
x x
u = v =
(3.2.7)
L
x
Then we can rewrite (3.2.4) in a vector form
t 1 t
I
maximize p x + U Qv
L/2 I
s. t. u € ｾ Zn
L/2 I
v € IT Z
1 n
(3.2.8)
where
Q =
(3.2.9)
It is again easy to show that (3.2.8) is equivalent to the
bilinear program in standard form:
I
maximize p t x 1 + U t Qv
L/2
s. t. u € IT Zn
1
L/2
v £ IT Z
1 n (3.2.10)
-19-
3.2.2 Three Dimensional Assignment Problem
1 , ••• ,m, n
= 1, ... ,p.
(Ri , Sj' Pk ).
to be assigned
Also each
(3.2.11)
variables x. 'k with the implication1J
the assignment (R.,S.,Pk ) takes place1 J1 if
o otherwise
Let there be m research assistants R., i =
1
scientists Sj' j = 1, ... ,n and p projects P k , k
Let a. 'k be the productivity of the combination1J
We will assume that each research assistant has
to one and only one combination of Sj and P k .
scientist S. can be assigned at most b. times and each project
J J
has to have at least c k combinations of scientists and research
assistants. This is a typical example of a three dimensional
assignment problem (see [22]).
Introducing three indexed
the problem can be formulated as follows:
,/' m n r./ maximize I II a. 'J x. 'ki=1 j=1 k=1 1J;: 1J ., n I1 s.t. L x. 'k = 1) j=1 k=1 1J'
I
1 m rL Xijk < b.- Ji=1 k=1I m nL I x ijk > CkI -
i i=1 j=1
"
x ijk = 0 or 1
i =. 1 , ••• " m
j = 1, ••• ,n
k = 1, ••• ,p
IJ., . k
1, J ,
(3.2.12)
Contrary to the two index case, the constraint matrix (3.2.12)
is not totally unimodular and hence cannot be solved by the
simplex method. This problem has mnp variables and m+n+p
constraints.
It has been shown, however, by A.M. Frieze [6] that this
problem is reformulated as a bilinear program. Let
y .. =
1)
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1 if R. is assigned to S.
ｾ )
o otherwise (3.2.13)
if Ri is assigned to Pk
otherwise (3.2.14)
Then since R. is assigned only once, we have the relationshipｾ
v.. . ,
1, J ,K
(3.3.15)
as long as the following conditions are satisfied:
n
ｾ y .. = 1 i = 1 , ... ,mj=1 1)
n
ｾ z .. = 1 i = 1 , ... ,m (3.2.16)j=1 1)
Hence (3.2.12) is equivalent to
m n Imax ｾ ｾ a ijk y .. Ziki=1 j=1 k=1 1)
n
s.t. ｾ y .. = 1 i = 1 , ••• , mj=1 1J
m
ｾ y .. < b. j = 1 , ••• , n
i=1 1) )
I Zik = 1 i = 1 , ••• , mk=1
m
ｾ zik > c k k = 1 , ..• , pi=:1 -
y .. , '7' = 0 or 1 y.. . k (3.2.17)1) ｾ ｩ ｫ ｾ ,) ,
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where we used the relationship
m I m I Zik) = mL Xijk = L (y .. L y ..i=l k=l i=l 1) k=l i=l 1)
etc. Let
{(Yij) I .I my = y .. = 1 , i = 1, .. . ,m; L y .. < b j , j = 1, •.. ,n}1) 1) -)=1 i=l
{ (z ik) I I mZ = .,. = 1 , i = 1, . .. ,m; L zik > c k ' k = 1, ••• ,p}... ik -k=l i=l (3.2.18)
The constraint matrices defining Y and Z are totally unimodular
i.e., the determinants of all the basis matrices are +1 or -1
and hence (3.2.17) is equivalent to the following BLP.
m n Imax L L a ijk y .. Ziki=l j=l k=l 1)
s.t. (y .. ) E: Y (z ik) E: Z (3.2.19)1)
This problem has 2m+n+p constraints (m more than (3.2.12)) and
only m(n+p) variables compared with mnp of (3.2.12). Also it
is important to notice that we can apply mountain climbing
algorithm to obtain a local solution in the .frarre\vork of standard
linear programming procedure, which is not the case for (3.2.12).
3.3 Reduction of a Sparse Matrix into an Almost Triangular
J'.1atrix
3.3.1 Some Examples
Let A = (aij ) be a given n x n matrix which contains nany zero
entries. It is sometimes desirable to permute the rows and/or
columns of this matrix and rearrange it into an almost triangular
matrix. Let us give here some of the typical examples.
a) Solution of a $ystem of Equations Ax = b
Let A be a nonsingular n x n matrix. It is well known that
-22-
the system of equations Ax = b can be solved by simple
substitution when A is either lower or upper triangular
matrix. Even if A is not triangular, the efficiency of Gaussian
elimination will be greatly enhanced if there are fewer entries
a·. ｾ 0, i > j (see [26]). So it is very desirable to find aｾｊ
way to permute rows and columns tv obtain an (almost) triangular
matrix.
b) Structuring of an Input-Output System
Let there be n industrial sectors Si each producing com-
modity C;, i = 1, ... ,n. Let us assume that a .. is the amount
... ｾｊ
of Ci required when Sj produces a unit amount of Cj . Then n x n
matrix A = (a .. ) represents the relationship among S.,
ｾ ｊ ｾ
i = 1, ... ,n. Let us say that S. is independent of S. if a .. = o.J ｾ ｾｊ
Suppose we want to put an ordering on S., i = 1, ... ,n based upon
ｾ
this notion of independence.
It is obvious that if we can arrange A into an upper-
triangular matrix by simultaneous permutation of rows and columns,
then it gives
1 2 3 4 5 3 4 1 2 5
x x x 1 x x x x x 3
x x 2 x x x x 4
x x x x x 3
==? x x x 1
x x x x 4 x x 2
x 5 x 5
a total ordering among the industries. This is not always
possible. However, if we can find an ordering which produces
an almost triangular matrix then it would serve as a reasonable
ordering.
c) Ranking n Players in a Contest
Suppose we are given the result of a contest played by n
persons Pi' i = 1, ... ,n. Each game is played between two players
and each pair of players played this game at most once. Let
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a .. = 1 if, and only if P. won over p)' and 0 otherwise. Then
1) 1
the ranking of these n players become the same problem as b)
above and the approach stated above would give one reasonable
ranking.
3.3.2 Mathematical Formulation
Let B = (bij ) be a binary n x n matrix associated with
A = (a .. ):
1)
1 if a .. t 0
1)
and let
b .. =
1)
o if a ..
1) = 0
(3.3.1)
n
= {X = (x .. ) E Rnxn I LX.. = 1,
1) j=1 1) i = 1, ... ,n;
n
Lj=1 x .. = 1, j = 1, ••• ,n}1)
pI = {X = (x .. ) E Rnxnlx E p ; x .. = 0 or 1, i, j = 1, ..• ,n}
n 1) n 1)
Pn and Zn are
ered as a set
applies to pI
n
essentially the same set except that P
n
is consid-
in Rnxn rather than in Rn 2 . The same remark
I
and Z as well.
n
a) Arbitrary Permutation of Rows and Columns
Any combination of row and column permutations of B can be
I I
represented as XBY where XEP
n
and YEP
n
• The number of nonzero
entries in the lower triangular portion of the matrix after the
n n
permutation is given by L L (XBY)... Therefore to minimize
j=1 i=j+1 1)
this quantity, we have to solve
n n
minimize {L L
j=1 i=j+1
(XBY) .. IX E p
n
I
, Y E pI}
1) n (3.3.2)
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or
n n n n
minimize L L L L
j=1 i=j+1 r=1 s=1
x. by.
ｾ ｲ rs sJ
s.t. (x .. ) £: zIｾ ｊ n ( ) £: Z
Iy ..
ｾ ｊ n
(3.3.3)
which is equivalent to a standard BLP without integrality
conditions
n n n n
minimize L L L L
j=1 i=j+1 r=1 s=1
x· by.ｾ ｲ rs rJ
s.t. (x .. ) £: zｾｊ n (y .. ) £: znｾｊ (3.3.3
1 )
Problem a) of the previous section falls into this category.
b) Synchronized Permutations of Rows and Columns
Suppose now that the permutation of rows i and j has to be
associated with the permutation of columns i and j. Then we
have to solve the following problem
ｾ Ｈ ｸ ｴ Ｌ ｘ Ｉ n n tmin = I L (X BX) ..j=1 i=j+1 ｾ ｊ
s.t. X £: pI (3.3.4)
n
or
ｾ Ｈ ｸ ｴ Ｌ ｘ Ｉ n n n nfin = L L L L x .b x .j=1 i=j+1 r=1 s=1 ｲ ｾ rs SJ
(x .. ) E: zI (3.3.4')s.t. ｾ ｊ n
This is a general quadratic assignment problem and we cannot
replace zI by Z . But it is at least theoretically possible
n n
to reduce this to a standard bilinear program as we shall see
in the following.
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Let
b .. (m) = b.. + mo ..1J 1J 1J i,j = 1, ... ,n (3.3.5)
where m is a positive constant and 0 .. is a standard Kronecker's1J
delta, Le.,
1 if i = j
0 .. =1J
o otherwise
Let us consider the following bilinear program:
(3.3.6)
n n n n
min £'m(Y'X) = I I I I y. b (m)}{.I j=1 i=j+1 r=1 s=1 1r rs sJ (3.3.7)s. t. X = (x .. ) E: P Y = (y .. ) E: Pn1J n 1J
Theorem 3.3. 1
and X*(m) solves (3.3.4) for m >
Let
solution
Y*(m) = (y'l'. (m)) and X*(m) = (x'l'. (m)) be an optimal
1J 1J n n
of (3.3.7). Then X* (m) = Y* (m) for m > m _ 'i' 'i'o L L 11 ..
ｪ ｾ Ｑ i=j+1 1J
Proof
First note that x*(m)E:p I and Y*(m)E:pI. Next, let us prove
n n
z'l'.(m) ｾ1J
n
I
r=1
y'l' (m) x* . (m) = 0.. Vi, j1r rJ 1J (3.3.8)
I I ISince x*(m)E:Pn and Y*(m)E:Pn , Z*(m) ｾ (zij(m))E:Pn . If (3.3.8)
does not hold, then there exists at least one pair of indices
(i,j), i > j for which Zij (m) = 1. It follows that yi£,(m) =
ｸｾｪＨｭＩ for £, = 1, •.. ,n. This implies that yik(m) = xkj(m) for
some k and yir(m) = ｘｾｪ (m) = 0 for all rand s such that r +k,
s +k. Thus
n n n n
I I I I ｙｩｲＨｭＩ｢ｲｳＨｭＩｸｾｪ (m) > bkk(m) > moj=1 i=j+1 r=1 s=1 -
n n n n
= I I I I o. b (m) 0 .j=1 i=j+1 r=1 s=1 1r rs SJ
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which is a contradiction to the assumption of optimality of
Y*(m) and X*(m) in (3.3.7). Thus we have established (3.3.8)
and therefore ｹ ｾ Ｎ (m) = ｸｾＮ (m) for all i,j. It follows from1J J 1
this that
and by obvious relation
we have
£m(X*(m)t, X*(m)) = min {£m(Xt,X) Ix E P
n
}
Le., X* (m) solves (3.3.7) . "
We have established the equivalence of (3.3.4) and (3.3.7).
From the computational point of view, however, solving (3.3.7)
instead of (3.3.4) would not be more attractive since (3.3.7)
necessarily has many local minima because of large diagonal
entries.
(4.1.1)
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4. Game-Theoretic Applications
4.1 Two-Stage Game: A Linear Max-Min Problem
The concept of a two stage game was first introduced by
Dantzig [ 4] and recently treated by the author [17] and by
Falk [ 5]. Also the author appli2d this concept to analyze the
current conflicting situation between resource producing
countries and industrialized cou.tries in a somewhat different
context [16].
Let there be two players (nations) P1 , P2 and let
S = {s1,s2, ... ,sm} and T = {t1,t2 , ... ,tn } be the sets of acti-
vities available to P 1 and P2 , respectively. At the first
stage of the game, P1 chooses an activity level vector
x = (x 1 ' ... ,xm) ｾ 0 which satisfies the given constraints. Let
us assume for simplicity that the feasible set of activities X
is defined by the system of linear inequalities:
X = {XERmIA1x ｾ a 1 , x > O}
k 1 xm k 1
where AER , a 1ER are given matrix and vector.
In the second stage of the game, given the full information on
the P1's choice of XEX. P2 chooses his action y from the fea-
ible set Y(x) which depends explicitly on x. Let us assume here
that Y(x) is also defined by the system of linear inequalities:
where
Y = {YERnIA2Y ｾ a 2 , y ｾ O}
By(X) = {Y ERn IB2y < b-B1X, y ｾ O}
(4.1.2)
(4.1.3)
We will assume here that Y(x) is nonempty and compact for all
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XEX. As to the payoff structure of this game, we will assume
that P1 has to pay
(4.1.4)
to P2 when P 1 and P2 choose XEX and YEY(X}, respectively, where
m n .P1ER , P2ER are glven vectors.
Given XEX, P2 naturally want, to maximize f(x,y} over
yEY(X}. Hence his problem is to
maximize (4.1.5)
(4.1.6)minimize
Let y*(x) be an optimal solution for this problem, which always
exists since we assumed that Y(x) is nonempty and compact for
all XEX. The problem for P 1 is now to
t t{P1 x + P2 Y*(x) IXEX}
or equivalently,
(4.1.7)ttlmin max {P1 x + P2Y B1X + B2y ｾ b}XEX yEY
Palk [ 5] named (4.1.7) a 'linear max-min problem'.Por fixed x,
the maximizing part with respect to y is a linear program
Taking the dual of this linear program:
we get a bilinear program which is equivalent to (4.1.7)
x > 0
(4.1.8)
Let us consider now the linear min-max problem associated with
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(4. 1 .7) •
max min ｻ ｰ ｾ ｸ + ｐｾｙｉｂＱｘ + B2y < b}yEY XEX (4.1.9)
This corresponds to the two stage game 1n which P2 plays first
and P1 plays next.
It is well known that in the standard zero sum two person
game where the sets of feasible ｳ ｾ ｲ ｡ ｴ ･ ｧ ｩ ･ ｳ X and Yare given by
m
X = { (x 1 ' . . . , xm) I .I x. = 1 x· > 01 1 -1=1
Y = {(Y1'···'Yn)! I y. = 1 y. > 0J J -
i = 1, ..• ,m}
j = 1, .•. ,n}
t
and where the payoff is given by x Ay where A is a given m x n
matrix the famous min-max theorem [25] holds:
. t A . tmax m1n x y = m1n max x Ay
yEY XEX XEX yEY
namely there exists an equilibrium. However, in our setting it
is quite exceptional to have an equilibrium.
Let
By(X) = {YERn !B2Y < b-B 1X}
Bx(y) = {XERm !B1X < b-B2y} (4.1.10)
The next theorem is an extended version of the one proved by
Falk [ 5] .
Theorem 4.1.1
Under the assumption we made,
max min ｻ ｰ ｾ ｘ + piylB1X + B2y ｾ b}yEY XEX
> min max ｻ ｰ ｾ ｘ + ｐｾｙｉｂＱｘ + B2y < b}XEX yEY (4.1.11)
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Proof
max min ｻ ｰ ｾ ｸ + ｐｾｙｉｂＱｘ + B2y :: b}ysY xsX
t + min ｛ ｐ ｾ ｘ ｉ ｂ Ｑ ｸ b - B2Y]}= max {P2Y <
-ysY xsX
t + min t> max {P2Y P1 x }
ysY xsJ.
min t t= {P1 x + max P2 Y}
xsX ysY
min t ｛ｐｾｙｉｂＲｙ b - B1X]}> {P 1x + max <- -
xsX ysY
min ｻ ｰ ｾ ｸ + t b}= max P2ylB 1X + B2y <-
xsX ysY
This theorem tells us an intuitively obvious fact that [5 ] P 1
will lose less if he plays first in the game. In fact Falk gives
an example in which strict inequality holds in (4.1.11).
Again (4.1.9) can be put into the structure of bilinear program:
t (b - t tmax P2Y + B2y) z 1 + a 1z 2
s.t. A2y < a 2 y > 0- -
t t P 1 ｾ 0B1 z 1 + A1z2 > z1-
(4.1.12)
In particular, if the structure of the game is symmetric, i.e.,
if P1 = P2 = p, A1 = A2 = A, B1 = B2 = B, a 1 = a 2 = a then
(4 . 1 . 8) and (4. 1 . 12) become:
(4.1.13)
(4.1.14)
where
t t tf(u,z1,z2) = P u + (b - Bu) z1 + a z2
U = {ulAu :: a, u > O}
{ I ttZ = (z1,z2) B z1 +Az 2 > p, z1 > 0, z2 > O}
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It is seen from these that only in a very exceptional
situation we have the equality in (4.1.11).
4.2 An Equilibrium Solution of a Constrained Bimatrix
Game
The standard bimatrix game (cr non zero-sum two person
game) is defined as follows [25]. Let there be two players
P1 , P 2 and let S = {s1 s 2, ... ,sm} ｾ ｮ ､ T = {t1 ,t2 , ... ,tn } be
the sets of actions available to P1 and P2 , respectively.
Assume that the payoffs to P1 and P2 when P 1 chooses si and P2
chooses t j are given by a ij and b ij , respectively. Given two
matrices A = (aij ), B = (bij ), each player chooses the mixed
strategies (or probability measure) on Sand T, i.e., P1
chooses XEXO and P 2 chooses YEYO where
(4.2.1)
(4.2.2)
where em and en are m and n dimensional vectors all of whose
components are ones. Then the expected payoffs to P 1 and P 2
are given by xtAY and xtBy, respectively. (Note that the two
players P1 and P2 choose x and y simultaneously). Let us denote
this game as f(A,X
o
; B,Y
o
).
Definition 4.2.1
A pair of mixed strategies (X,Y)EXO x Yo is a Nash equi-
librium point of a bimatrix game f(A,X : B,Y ) if
o 0
(4.2.3)
( 4.2.4 )
The Nash equilibrium point implies that as long as P1 sticks to
X, then Y is the optimal mixed strategies for P2 and vice versa.
It has been shown in [2] that the problem of obtaining a Nash
equilibrium point of (A,X
o
: B,Y
o
) can be reduced to a linear
complementarity problem (LCP):
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m+n t ( ) = 0Find: ZER such that Z ｾ 0, s + Mz ｾ 0 and Z s + Mz
where
] showed that their ingeneous comple-
generates a solution to this problem
Also Lemke and Howson [
mentary pivot algorithm
in finitely many steps.
Now let us introduce a constrained bimatrix game f (A,X :B, Y)
in which P1 and P2 have to choose their mixed strategies x an y
from more general constraint sets X an Y, respectively. We will
call X and Y admissible sets and XEX, yEY admissible strategies.
Definition 4.2.2
A pair of admissible strategies (X,y)EX x Y is called a Nash
equilibrium point of f(A,X: B,Y) if
ｾ ｴ ａ Ｍx Y = max (4.2.5)
(4.2.6)
The following fundamental theorem has been established by Nash
[ 2 ] •
Theorem 4. 2 . 1
If both X and Yare non-empty, compact and convex, then
f(A,Xi B,Y) has a Nash equilibrium point for arbitrary A and B.
Though this existence theorem has been known for years, no
algorithm has been proposed except for the standard bimatrix
game f(A,Xoi B,Y
o
) and for zero sum game i.e., A + B = O.
Let us now consider the 'constrained' bimatrix game (A,X 1 :B,Y1 )
where
m2
Y1 = {YER IP2y = P2' Y > O}
t. xm. t.
111
where PiER , PiER i = 1,2.
(4.2.7)
(4.2.8)
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We will pursue along the line developed in [20] and reduce the
problem of obtaining an equilibrium point of r(A,X,: B,Y,) into
a bilinear program.
First let us state the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2.2
(X,y)EX x Y is an equilibrium point of r(A,X,; B,Y 1 ) if
and only if tney satisfy the foll)wing system dual variables
£1 ,(1,2
together with uER and vER
ｾ ｴ ａ ｾ ｴ ｾ 0 ｾｴｂｾ ｴｾ 0x Y - P1 u = x Y - P2v =
Ay ｴｾ < 0 Btx ｰ ｴ ｾ 0- P 1u - 2v <- -
P 1x = P1
ｰｴｾ
= P22Y
x > 0 (4.2.8) Y > 0 (4.2.9)
- -
Proof
The right hand sides of definitions (4.2.5) (4.2.6) when
A= X1 and Y = Y1 are linear programs. (4.2.8) follows from
(4.2.5) by the duality theorem of linear programming. (4.2.9)
follows from (4.2.6) analogously. I I
Let us now introduce an associated bilinear program in view
of (4.2.8) and (4.2.9)
maximize ep (x, y, u, v)
t t t
= x (A+B)y - P1 u - P2v
s.t. < 0
x > 0
< 0
(4.2.10)
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Theorem 4.2.3
A necessary and sufficient condition for (x,y) to be an
equilibrium point of r(A,x 1 : B'Y1) is that (x,y) is an optimal
solution of (4.2.10). Also ¢(x,y,u,v) = 0 at the optimum.
Proof
Let (x,y)
by (4 • 2 . 8 ) and
constraints of
be an equilibrium point of r(A,X 1 ; B,Y1 ). Then
(4.2.9), (x,y) tog'ther with Ｈ ｩ ｪ Ｌ ｾ Ｉ satisfy the
(4.2.10), Le., Ｈ ｸ Ｌ ｹ Ｌ ｩ ｪ Ｌ ｾ Ｉ is a feasible solution
Also ﾢ Ｈ ｸ Ｌ ｹ Ｌ ｩ ｪ Ｌ ｾ Ｉ = O. However, by premultiplying
first and the third inequalities of (4.2.10) and
of (4 . 2 . 10) .
t t
x , Y to the
using the facts that P 1x = P1 and P2y = P2' we obtain the in-
equality.
0 t t t t t> x Ay - x P u = x Ay - P1u
-
0 t t t t> x By v Qy = x By - P2v
and hence ¢(x,y,u,v) < 0 for all feasible solution of (4.2.10),
-
whence Ｈ ｸ Ｌ ｹ Ｌ ｩ ｪ Ｌ ｾ Ｉ is an optimal solution of (4.2.10). Let
Ｈ ｸ ｾ Ｌ ｹ Ｊ Ｌ ｵ Ｊ Ｌ ｶ Ｊ Ｉ be another optimal solution for (4.2.10). Then
¢(x*,y*,u*,v*) = O. But this holds if and only if
t t t t(x*) Ay* - P1u* = (x*) By· - P2v* = 0
so that (x*,y*,u*,v*) satisfies both (4.2.8) and (4.2.9), i.e.,
(x*,y*,u*,v*) is also an equilibrium point of r(A,X 1 : B,Y 1 )· I I
This theorem states that the optimal objective value of (4.2.10)
is equal to zero regardless of the data of the problem. This
property is quite worthwhile since we can generate a 'deep' cut
at a poor local maximum point where the objective functional
value is far from optimal (see [13]).
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5. Miscellaneous Bilinear Programs
5.1 Non-Standard Generalized Linear Program
Generalized linear program (GLP) introduced by Dantzig
and Wolfe [3] has the following problem structure:
1, •.. ,n be given.
compact convex set
respect to (:;) as
and Wolfe proceeds
n
min I c.x.j=1 J J
n
s.t. I a.x. = bj=1 J J
x. > 0 (:;) E c.J - J
h Rm R1 d C CRm+1 .were a j £ , c j £ an j 1S a
j = 1, .•• ,n and maximization is with
as x j . The GLP algorithm by Dantzig
as follows Ｚ Ｈ ｣ ｾ Ｇ )
Let J £ C., t = 1, ..• , t
J
., j =ｾｴ J
. a.
J
Then we will solve the linear program:
(5.1.1)
well
roughly
t.
n t ｾｴ tmin I c.x.j=1 t=1 J J
to
n
I J ｾｴ tL a.x. = b (:5.1.2)j=1 t=1 J J
t
> 0 t 1 , ••. , t j j 1 , ••• , nx. = =J -
and let TI£Rm be an optimal multiplier vector for this linear
program.
If
c. - 7T a. > 0
J J
j = 1, .•. ,n
then the current solution is optimal. If, on the other hand
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there is an index j and a vector which
for which c. - n a. > 0, we solve the following n sub-
J J
function will be improved byc. - n a. > 0, then the objective
J J
introducting this vector into the(:i)
J
basis. To find out the vectors
programs.
min (c. - if a. '(C i ) £ C.) j 1 •... ,n (5. 1. 3 )
Let Ｈ Ｚ ｾ ) be J its ｏ ｐ Ｚ ｩ ｭ Ｚ ｾ SOlU:ion. If ｣ ｾ - ii ｡ ｾ < 0, then we
will introduce it into (5.1.2) and proceed. If Cj are all
polyhedral convex sets, then this algorithm will converge to
the optimal solution of (5.1.1) in finitely many steps if we
avoid cycling caused by degeneracy appropriately.
Now let us consider the non-standard GLP with some free
variables, i.e.,
n
min I
j=1
c.x.
J J
n
s.t. I a.x. = bj=1 J J
x. > 0
J -
> 0x. - ,J <
ＨＺｾｽ c. ,J
j 1, ••• ,R. ;
j = R.+1, ... ,n (5.1.4)
j = 1, ... ,n
The usual technique of replacing a free variable by two non-
negative variables destroys the structure of the problem, i.e.,
let
> 0 x.') > 0J ... .' j = ,q,+1, ... ,n
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then the problem is
ｾ
min I
j=1
ｾ
Lj=1
c.x. +
J J
a.x. +
J J
x. > 0
J
> 0
j = 1, ... Ｌ ｾ
j == ｾＫ 1 , ••• ,n
1, •.. Ｌ ｾ Ｎ ｾ Ｋ 1 , ••• , n
(5.1.5)
Hence the columns of this problem are no longer independent and
GLP algorithm in its original form would not work.
Now let us consider the simplest case of the above in which
a j 's are constant and only c j 's are allowed to move in compact
convex sets, i.e., closed interval in this case
ｾ n
min L c.x. + L c.x.j==1 J J ｪ］ｾＫＱ J J
ｾ n
s.t. I a.x. + I a.x. = bj=1 J J ｪ］ｾＫＱ J J
x. > 0 j = 1 , ••• , ｾ
J -
c. < c. < c. j = 1 , ••• , n
-J - J - J (5.1.6)
Since x j > 0, j == 1, •.. Ｌ ｾ Ｌ it is obvious that optimal c. 's are
C- • 's for J' - 1 n ICY th bl . I . f . JJ - , ••• ,N. ｾ ･ ｮ ｣ ･ e pro em slmp 1 les somewhat to
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ｾ n
min L c.x. + L y.x.j=1 J J ｪ］ｾＫＱ J J
ｾ n
s.t. L a.x. + L a.x. = bj=1 J J ｪ］ｾＫＱ J J
x. > 0 j = 1 , ... , ｾJ -
c. < y. < c. j = ｾＫ 1 , ... , n (5.1.7)
-J - J - J
We will use the standard elimination technique to obtain an
expression of x k ' k = ｾＫＱＬ ... ,n with respect to x j ' j = 1, ..• Ｌ ｾ Ｎ
Let
X· = d. +J JO j = ｾＫ 1 , -. •• , n (5.1.8)
Substituting these into (5.1.7), we obtain
ｾ [e j n dkjYk]Xj nmin L + L + L d. y.j=1 ｫ ］ ｾ Ｋ Ｑ ｪ ］ ｾ Ｋ Ｑ JO J
ｾ
s.t. L ｡ｾｸＮ = b lj=1 J J
x. > 0
J
c. < y. < c.
-J - J - J
j = 1, ••• ,
j = ｾＫ 1, ••• , n (5.1.9)
which is a BLP with special structure. The following theorem
characterizes the form of the optimal solution.
Theorem 5.1.1
Let ｣ ｾ Ｌ ｸ ｾ Ｌ j = 1, ... ,n be an optimal solution (if it
J J
exists at all) of (5.1.4). Then ｣ ｾ = c., J' = 1, •.. Ｌ ｾ and ｣ ｾJ -J J
is either gj or c j for j = ｾＫＱＬ ... ,n.
Proof
By the fundamental theorem of BLP [13J, there is an optimal
solution y* = (Yl+1' ... Ｇ ｹ ｾ Ｉ where y* is an extreme point of the
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constraint set {(Y£+1'··· 'Yn) 19j s: Yj s: c j ' j = £+1, ... ,n}. II
We have shown that bilinear programming technique gives a
way to solve (5.1.4). This need not, of course, be the best
way to solve this class of problems. Typically, the modified
version of generalized linear programming algorithm might be
able to solve them more efficiently. We will not, however, go
into this subject in more detail ｾ ･ ｲ ･ Ｎ
5.2 Complementary Planning Problems
5.2.1 Problem and Examples
Let us consider the following class of problems
> 0 > 0
(5.2.1)
where
and xi' Yi are variable vectors of appropriate dimensions. The
last constraint ｸ ｾ ｸ Ｒ = 0 will be called complementary constraints
in the sequel.
t10re general problems with complementary constraints
minimize t + t + dtyc 1x 1 c 2x 2
s.t. A1X 1 + A2x 2 + By
> b
-
x 1 > 0 x 2 > 0- -
t 0x 1x 2 =
has been discussed by Ibaraki [10] [11 ],
theorem and proposed an enumeration type
y > 0
(5.2.2)
who proved the following
of algori thIn.
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Theorem 5.2.1
If the constraint set of (5.2.2) is bounded, then (5.2.2)
has an optimal solution among basic feasible solutions.
Let us first introduce several typical examples of (5.2.1).
a) Complementary Flows in Network
Suppose we want to send two different kinds of flows F 1
and F 2 on a pipe line network. ｾ = want to send Fi from source
Si to sink Ti , i = 1,2. Horeover, we assume that two kinds of
flows cannot be mixed with each other by some reason or the
other. If the capacity of a certain arc consists of many small
independent pipes, (more specifically each arc consists of small
pipes of 1/2 unit capacity), this problem can be handled by two
commodity flow algorithm of Hu [9]. However, if the arc with
capacity a. consists of a single pipe, then we have to have a
ｾ
constraint
(5.2.3)
where x .. implies the amount of flow F; on arc A ..
ｾ ｊ ｾ J
Associated with this there are the following three typical
problems
(i) Feasibility problem: Can we send some specified
amount of flows F 1 and F2 without mixing them up?
(ii) Haximum complementary flow problem: ｾ Ｇ ｊ ｨ ｡ ｴ is the
maximum sum of flows F 1 and F2 we can send on the
network without mixing two flows?
(iii) Minimum cost complementary flow problem: Find the
minimum cost complementary flow satisfying the given
flow requirement.
All these problems can be formulated in the framework of (5.2.1).
b) Orthogonal Production Scheduling
It sometimes happens in the optimization of a multi stage
production system that the use of certain activities in two
consecutive periods
(i) is prohibited (e.g., due to machine maintenance)
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(ii) incurs high penalty cost (e.g., hysterisis effects
in agricultural production system).
These types of problems can also be put into the form of (5.2.1).
5.2.2 Solution Technique
The most standard way to solve (5.2.1) is. to introduce an
t-dimensional vector u of 0-1 components and replace the
t · t bcons ra1nts x 1x 2 = 0 x 1 ｾ 0, x 2 ｾ 0 y:
x 1 < 1'10 u
x 2 < 1'10 (et-u)
x 1 > 0 , x 2 > 0
Here ･ ｾ is the ｾ dimensional vector all of whose components are
1's and M
o
is a constant satisfying
tU > max {e 0 x. IA. x. + B. y. > b" x 1, > 0, Y1' > O}o N 1 1 1 111
i = 1,2
The equivalence can be seen as follows:
u. = 0 ｾｻｸＱＧ < 0,J J -
Hence (5.2.1) is equivalent to the following mixed 0-1 integer
programming problem:
maximize t t t tc 1x 1 + d 1Y1 + c 2x 2 + d 2Y2
s.t. A1X1 + B1Y1 > b 1-
A2x 2 + B2Y2 > b 2-
x 1 - 1-1 u < 00 -
x 2 + M u < 1'1 e0 - o n
x 1 > 0, Y1 > 0, x 2 > 0, Y2 > 0- - - -
u = (u 1 ,u2 '···,u£)
u. = 0 or 1, j = 1, ••• ,t
J
(5.2.4)
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This can be solved by a usual branch and bound technique if t
is not too large. Instead,we will propose another classical
approach, i.e., penalty function approach by putting xix2 = °
term into the objective function:
maximize t t t t tc 1x 1 + d 1Y1 + c 2x 2 + d 2Y2 Mx 1X2
s.t. A1X1 + B1Y1 > b 1-
A2X2 + B2Y2 > b 2-
x 1 > 0, Y1 > 0, x 2 ｾ 0, Y2 ｾ 0 (5.2.5)- -
which is a BLP in canonical maximization form.
Theorem 5.2.1 If the constraint set of (5.2.1) is bounded,
then there exists a constant M
o
such that (5.2.1) is equivalent
to (5.2.5) for M > M .o
Proof
This can be proved by standard technique and will be
omitted here.
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6. Concluding Remarks
We have picked up several examples of bilinear programs
and discussed them in some detail. Some of them are of real
practical interest (Chapter 2,3 and Section 5.2) and the others
are more of a theoretical nature (Chapter 4 and Section 5.1).
The style of presentation is somewhat different for these two
groups of examples, but we hope ｾ ｨ ｡ ｴ the readers are more or
less convinced of the applicability and importance of bilinear
programming through these examples.
The difficulty of nonconvex programs to which bilinear
program belongs is the existence of mUltiple local maxima. The
problems treated in Chapter 2 is easier from this viewpoint
than those in Chapter 3 and Section 5.2. Also the problems in
Chapter 3 are inevitably of high dimensionality and therefore
appear to be more difficult than those in Chapter 2. The game
theoretic problems of Chapter 4 may appear to be only of theo-
retical interest to some readers, but the two stage game of
Section 4.1 will have more importance in the future as the
author has shown in [16]. Also, a constrained bimatrix game of
Section 4.2 will have some applications in decisions under multi-
ple objectives.
Bilinear programming is still in its babyhood and a lot of
things have to be done if we want to solve a reasonably large
real world problem. The efficiency of cutting plane algorithm
developed in [13] is not yet authorized by an extensive testing
on the computers, though the preliminary results are encouraging.
On the other hand, the enumerative approaches of [5] [7] as they
stand now appear to be hopelessly expensive for larger probleMs.
Anyway there is a lot of space for improvements in the efficiency
of these two groups of algorithms and works in this area will be
quite worthwhile.
The last remark is in order: While it is usually difficult
to obtain a global optimum, the augmented mountain climbing
algorithm of [13] will be useful to obtain a good local optimum
without too much expenses.
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